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The current global crisis may change globalization itself, as both developed and developing countries adjust to global imbalances that contributed to the crisis. Will these changes help or hinder economic recovery and growth in South Asia? This is the focus of this paper.
The three models of globalization--trade, capital, and economic management--may not be the same in the future. Changes in globalization could change the composition of trade flows, capital flows, and economic management, which in turn, could accelerate or restrain growth.
South Asia is somewhat peculiar and different from other regions in how it has globalized, although there is a lot of diversity within the region. Its trade characteristics are different. India's growth has been spearheaded by exports of modern services and less by goods exports. Modern service trade tends to be more resilient compared with goods trade. Globalization of services is still at an early stage. So, as consumers pull back in the United States, service trade is likely to be less impacted compared to goods trade. Trade also contributes to growth through This paper-a product of the Economic Policy and Poverty Sector, South Asia Region-is part of a larger effort in the department to better understand how changes in globalization will impact growth. Policy Research Working Papers are also posted on the Web at http://econ.worldbank.org. The author may be contacted at Eghani@worldbank.org. knowledge spillovers, externalities, and learning. The global crisis has not reduced the stock of global knowledge.
Changes in capital flows are also not likely to have a big impact on growth in South Asia, as South Asia's investments are largely driven by domestic savings. Its dependence on foreign capital is low. South Asia has attracted capital flows that are less volatile. Remittances, which are more resilient, have been the dominant form of capital inflows, exceeding foreign direct investment and other inflows.
This global downturn calls for counter-cyclical economic management. But South Asia has limited room for fiscal stimulus, given high debt-to-gross domestic product ratios. Nevertheless, reduced commodity prices have created some fiscal space that can be used for growth enabling infrastructure and safety nets. As South Asia undergoes structural transformation, the region is well positioned to bounce back with global economic recovery. 
A. Introduction
Many economists are beginning to see signs of an end to the global economic crisis. Talk has turned now to how long the recovery will take. But there is another concern about how this crisis may have reshaped the global economy and how it may have changed globalization in ways that will hinder recovery in many countries. Some Finance Ministers are concerned whether changes in globalization will help or hinder the pace of economic recovery.
Past experiences with global recessions show that when global recessions are financial in nature and synchronized, it typically takes much longer to recover (World Economic Outlook, IMF, April 2009 ). This crisis is the mother of all crises. Its scope and amplitude are unprecedented. Thus it is likely that the recovery process may be long and painful and thus the concern about the timing of recovery.
South Asia has witnessed a growth miracle in the past five years. The growth rate has been exceptional by any standard. Globalization has accelerated growth in the region and contributed to poverty reduction. But the current global crisis may potentially change globalization itself, as developed countries adjust to global imbalances that contributed to the crisis. It appears that the three aspects of globalization -capital flows, trade flows, and economic management -may not be the same in the future. Trade flows will be diminished and exports may not be a powerful engine of growth as developed countries try to correct the imbalance by consuming less and saving more. Also, growth in the developed world is either negative or stagnant. Thus, the chances of external demand for traded goods picking up anytime soon are bleak. Capital flows are not likely to reach its pre-crisis levels in the short-term, and South Asia's rising public debt means there is less room for economic management, such as fiscal stimulus.
So, how will these changes in globalization impact South Asia's recovery and prospects of medium term growth? South Asia's recovery will be determined by a number of factors. Particularly critical are trade, foreign capital flows, and economic management.
In the present paper we analyze these three major channels of globalization to study whether the changed globalization is going to hinder or assist the recovery of South Asia. We show that South Asia has followed a very peculiar path of growth and the distinctive features of the region are going to help them in recovering faster than most other regions and also in sustaining high growth in the medium term. South Asia's foreign trade has grown considerably over the last decade, which has contributed to rapid growth. Trade is always low during crisis, but rebounds quickly during recovery. Many countries in past crisis have accelerated their recovery with the help of expanding exports. The recovery of East Asian countries following the crisis in the 1990s was achieved by exporting to developed countries. Given that the current crisis is synchronized and global in nature, and world economic growth may be slower, it leaves less room for an export led recovery.
South Asia is less likely to benefit from a goods export led recovery, as its goods trade to GDP ratio is small compared to others. South Asia has a very unique and distinctive growth and trade pattern. Unlike East Asia, South Asia's economy is largely service driven. Services have been the largest contributor to growth in the region. Contrary to the growth experience of other regions, South Asia has transformed itself from a region of primary products to a region of services virtually skipping the manufacturing stage. Quality of service exports from the region resemble that of developed countries.
This unique trade and growth pattern of South Asia has important implications for the recovery of the region. Service exports are less volatile compared to goods exports. Globalization of services is still at an early stage and they are likely to grow faster even during the crisis. Structural transformation and very high quality of service exports is likely to help the region sustain growth in the face of the present crisis.
What matters for growth is the income gap between the developing and developed countries and since there is a large scope for catching up for South Asia, the region is likely to recover quickly. Also, growing South-South trade is likely to counteract the declining external demands from advanced countries. Thus, a service led export growth strategy will likely enable South Asia to recover faster and sustain high growth over the medium term. But not all countries will benefit as there is tremendous diversity within South Asia. Countries will be required to focus on their competitive advantages.
Foreign capital inflows-remittances, international syndicated bank lending, private capital investments, and issue of bonds-to South Asia had surged in recent years, but collapsed in the aftermath of the crisis. With the ongoing global financial restructuring, it will take time for foreign capital flows to recover. Even then the capital flows will be less in a new risk-averse environment, and the cost of capital will be higher. This will slow down the economic recovery. However, South Asia, even with lower capital flows, will suffer less compared to other regions because of its peculiar features.
South Asia is much less dependent on foreign capital than many other regions. South Asia's investments are largely driven by domestic savings. Most South Asian countries have a large and significant positive savings rate compared to other developing countries which can help the region recover even though the flows will take some time to recover. Also, entering the crisis with a high level of investment and saving rates, South Asia is better positioned to stage a recovery and sustain growth.
South Asia is also unique in attracting capital flows that are less volatile. The region relies more on remittances inflows than traditional forms of inflows like portfolio flows and bank loans. Remittances have exceeded FDI and portfolio flows during most of the last two decades. Remittances are less volatile and more persistent (although not totally immune to the global downturn). Given the high domestic savings and less dependence on volatile capital inflows, South Asia is likely to bounce back faster.
The speed of recovery will also be determined by the scope and implementation of fiscal policies. South Asia is vulnerable in this area. South Asia, unlike East Asia, did not tighten its fiscal policies and reduce public debt during the boom period to create sufficient room for fiscal stimulus during the downturn. Unlike East Asia, the region suffers from high ratios of public debt to GDP. This limits the scope for a large scale fiscal stimulus. But there is some room.
South Asia is the largest net importer of commodities (food, metal, and oil) in relation to GDP. Decline in commodity prices, especially oil, has reduced large commodity-related subsidies, creating some room to pursue expansionary and growth enabling fiscal policy.
However, the profligacy in pre-crisis times has proved to be a boon in disguise for some of the countries like India. It has boosted the internal demand and thus helped the process of recovery.
What kind of fiscal stimulus is appropriate for South Asia? Will South Asia benefit more from increased investments in hard infrastructure (roads, power, water) or in soft infrastructure (education, health, safety nets), or both? South Asia spends too little on education, health, roads, power, and water compared to the rest of the world. Increased and better expenditure with a greater focus on improved outcomes in social and physical infrastructure, and safety nets can speed up the recovery consistent with long-term growth.
The current literature on the global financial crisis has largely focused on the causes of the crisis. It has been a bit silent on what impact this will have on the medium-term growth outlook of developing countries. This paper addresses this gap. This paper is an attempt to answer an important question bothering the policy makers. Will the changes in globalization accelerate or restrain recovery?
We contend that new trends in globalization will create new challenges but will also provide new opportunities. Increased trade from globalization of services, goods, and increasing South-South trade will provide new trade opportunities for South Asia. There are substantial opportunities for developing countries to catch-up with developed countries. South Asia will continue to benefit from demographic dividend and productivity growth will remain on an upward trajectory. As South Asia undergoes structural transformation from agriculture to manufacturing and service sectors, the region will be well positioned to bounce back with global economic recovery. The findings in this paper are meant to stimulate discussion rather than come up with precise solutions, which will vary from country to country, and region by region, and the speed of global economic recovery.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section B examines trade globalization. Section C discusses capital globalization. Section D analyzes the macro management dimensions of globalization. Section E concludes.
B. Trade, recovery and growth
Increased trade integration and rapid expansion of trade is widely believed to be a major contributor of the phenomenal growth witnessed by South Asian economies in the last decade. Financial crisis has changed the very process of globalization. Global trade has contracted. Declining trade and lowered external demand has put serious questions about the role of trade being a vehicle of recovery and growth in South Asia. Growth in advanced countries has turned negative (or at best has been stagnant). They are also compelled by this crisis to correct some of the imbalances (by reducing consumption and increasing savings). Implication is that the chances of external demand for exports picking up in near future are rather grim. This changed scenario implies that export led recovery, a strategy adopted by East Asian economies following the 90s crisis, is less of an option this time around.
This crisis has changed the very agenda of debate on trade globalization and growth. How this changed trade flows model is going to affect the recovery and future growth of South Asia? We analyze the question by looking at the distinctive growth and trade patterns of South Asia. There is no doubt that reduced trade is going to have an adverse effect on the recovery and growth of the region. However, their distinctive features put them in a different category from others. It seems that the impact of crisis through the trade channel is going to be less severe and recovery much faster for South Asia than other regions.
First, we look at the distinctive growth features of South Asia. What is driving growth in South Asia? How is it different from the growth experience of other regions? Growth miracle of South Asian is service led unlike East Asia which is a story of manufacturingled growth miracle. Services are the major contributor to GDP in South Asia, accounting for more than 50% of GDP in all South Asian countries-India, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka and Nepal. How distinctive is this pattern of growth for South Asia? Figure 1 shows the size of service value added in GDP in South Asia, East Asia, and OECD countries, as a function of the level of GDP per capita. All South Asian economies have a much bigger share of services in GDP relative to their level of real GDP per capita. In contrast, service sector is relatively smaller in all East Asian countries considering their much higher income levels. South Asian GDP composition resembles that of developed economies like Ireland and Norway, rather than that of China and Malaysia. Despite being a low income region, South Asian countries have adopted the growth patterns of middle/high income countries i.e. their growth is driven by services and not by agriculture or manufacturing. Apart from being the largest contributor to GDP levels, services are also the largest contributor to GDP growth in South Asia. Figure 2 compares the sectoral contribution of service, industry, and agriculture, to GDP growth for South Asian countries with China and Korea for the period 1980-85 and 2000-2007 . Contribution of service sector to GDP growth in South Asia is nearly double than the contribution of industry to GDP growth. On the contrary, in China and Korea, the contribution of industry to GDP growth is much higher as compared to the contribution of service sector to GDP growth. Contribution of services in GDP growth is increasing over time in all South Asian countries, except Bangladesh.
Growth in South Asia is driven by structural changes
Unlike other economies, the miraculous growth story of South Asia is scripted by the service sector growth. South Asia, it seems has consciously skipped the manufacturing sector, and has leaped straight from agriculture into services. This massive structural transformation from primary good producer region into the region of services has been a key driver of growth in the region. Note: Labor Productivity is calculated as average annual growth in real output per worker. The contribution from resource reallocation is calculated by subtracting each sector's growth rate, weighted by the sector's share in value added at the outset of each sub-period, from the total economy's growth rate. The figure is restricted to only positive contributions to labor productivity growth.
Services in South Asia have much higher productivity as compared to agriculture and industry (Table 1 ) and growth in service productivity has contributed the most to the
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Total Agriculture Industry Services overall growth in labor productivity in the region ( Figure 3 ). South Asia differs significantly on these dimensions from East Asia. In East Asia, industrial sector has the highest productivity growth and has contributed the most to the growth of national productivity. Even in USA the contribution of industrial and service productivity growth are nearly equal. This structural transformation of the region has led to the reallocation of resources from traditional low productivity activities (agriculture) to modern high productivity activities (services). Reallocation of resources has resulted in an increase in the overall productivity and high growth ( Figure 4 ). It is clear that the benefits of reallocation have been higher in the period 2000-06. Even though other countries have also benefited from this reallocation, the increase in the national labor productivity growth rate from the reallocation of labor across sectors is much higher in South Asia as compared to China and USA ( Figure 3 ).
Thus growth in South Asia has been driven by structural changes and the benefits of reallocation therein. There is still a huge productivity gap between agriculture and services in the region. Also, the size of agricultural sector (a low productivity activity) is huge in South Asia. Thus there is an ample scope for sustaining a service-led growth in South Asia, as resources will continue to reallocate from low productivity to high productivity sectors even during the crisis.
Also, even though the productivity of services is higher than other sectors in South Asia, there is an enormous scope of catching up with developed countries. The crisis has not diminished the stock of global knowledge and South Asian economies can still benefit from them to raise their skill levels and reap the benefits of structural change and reallocation effects. Catching up will drive the growth and not the rate of growth of advanced countries.
Slowing down of growth in advanced countries can only have indirect impact on the growth of South Asia through the channels of trade and capital flows. Per se lower growth rate in advanced countries does not imply an automatic slowing of growth in developing countries. What matters for growth in South Asia is not the growth rate of the advanced countries but the difference between the income levels of the rich and South Asian economies. It is this convergence gap, which matters for growth and hence recovery (Rodrik, 2009) . South Asia still faces a huge convergence gap with high income countries and it is the catching up which is going to drive growth even during the crisis and thereafter.
There is an ample scope for catch up in productivity for South Asian economies. Overall labor productivity is still very low in South Asia (Table 1) . Even though services have been a major driver of growth, the productivity of this sector is still too low compared to advanced economies. South Asian countries have started from a low technological base compared to international best practice in services. It is the catching up phenomenon which has resulted in the rapid productivity growth in services in South Asia in last couple of years. As we notice (Table 1) there is still an enormous scope for rapid catch up in this sector just like manufacturing. Services have huge potential for productivity gains from learning, networking, and knowledge spillovers. Even though the growth in advanced countries has become low or even negative the pool of technological know how has not gone down in these economies. Since important factors which can potentially improve productivity of services sector remain unaffected by the crisis South Asian economies can continue to improve their productivity and hence grow.
Since there is a huge convergence gap between South Asia and advanced economies, the present crisis is not likely to hurt the growth prospects of South Asia. With suitable policies in place this could be used to stage a recovery and sustain growth.
What matters is not how much you export but what you export.
Declining trade volumes have affected growth adversely in the region. Reduced quantity of exports has raised doubts about the recovery and sustainability of growth in South Asia. However, what matters for growth is not how much a country exports but what they export (Rodrik, 2008) . Growth potential of different exported goods differs significantly and high productivity exports lead to much higher growth. Thus Countries can grow rich by exporting what rich countries export. One implication of this is that developing countries can grow even during the crisis by exporting modern, high quality products. South Asia over the last decade has emerged as a hub for service export. From a low base, South Asia has experienced an exponential growth in service export compared to East Asia (see Figure 5) . The pace at which the share of service export has grown has exceeded the growth rate in share of service export and goods export from East Asia during the last decade. Modern impersonal service exports have grown much faster than the traditional service exports (Figure 6 ) 1 . South Asia seems to be an exception in this regard too. Growth of modern services in South Asia has been more than double the global growth rate. It is much higher than any of the East Asian countries with India leading the pack. A good measure of modern impersonal service export is IT and IT-enabled services. Crosscountry data for IT exports is available only from 2000 onwards. In 2000, India stands out as a significant and positive outlier when we compare its share of IT and IT-enabled exports in total exports of goods and services with the rest of the world controlling for the 1 The modern impersonal service includes what Baumol called in 1984 "progressive impersonal services."
They can be delivered impersonally and electronically. These include communication, banking, insurance, and business related services. These services take advantage of ICT, globalization, scale economies, and benefit from higher productivity growth rates. Traditional personal service includes what Baumol has called "stagnant personal services" such as trade, hotel, restaurant, beauty shops, barbers, education, and health. It requires face to face transaction. Traditional services also include "stagnant impersonal services" such as transport, government, and public administration service. (Table 2) . Other South Asian countries including Pakistan and Sri Lanka also have significant positive coefficients. Bangladesh is the only country in South Asia whose modern service export is no different than the norm. Figure 7 compares the share of IT and IT-enabled service, the fastest growing modern impersonal service, in total service export against real GDP per capita for South Asia, East Asia and OECD countries. Bangladesh, Pakistan and Sri Lanka have a much higher share of IT and IT enabled services in their service export for their level of income while most East Asian countries including China are below the global norm. India is a huge outlier on this count. In general, service exports from South Asia, which are mostly skill intensive, have more in common with OECD countries, than with other developing countries. The share of modern services export (such as IT and IT enabled service exports) in total service exports for South Asia resembles the export patterns of more developed economies like USA. Thus in terms of export sophistication South Asia is like advanced economies.
In order to firm up this idea we construct an index to measure the sophistication level of service exports of South Asian countries on the lines of sophistication level of goods (2007) 2 . It is more of an indicative measure mirroring the concept of EPXY of Hausmann, Hwang and Rodrik (2007) since we don't have the finer classification of services as compared to those for goods and also availability of data for various types of services is not easily available for most countries 3 . We plot the trend sophistication for selected emerging economies in Figure 8 . Starting from a very similar level of sophistication, India has taken off exponentially since 2000. The result is largely driven by large share of modern computer and IT exports from India which is a very high skill product. In terms of sophistication of service exports, India is much ahead of rest of the East Asian economies. 2 We calculate the PRODY and EXPY for services on the similar lines of Hausmann, Hwang and Rodrki (2007) . More formally, the PRODY and EXPY measures are calculated in the following way:
where Yi is the per-capita GDP of country i and is the value-added share of commodity j in the country's overall export basket. While PRODY is a measure of productivity level associated with a product while EXPY is the measure of the productivity level of a country's export basket. Thus it can be interpreted as sophistication level of a country's export basket. For details see Hausmann, Hwang and Rodrik (2007) .
3 Due to data and classification issues we are forced to use ten different categories of services as income weights to come up with this measure as opposed to thousands of commodities categories used by Hausmann, Hwang and Rodrik (2007) . Figures show striking evidence of the positive correlation between growth and services sophistication, a relationship which Hausmann, Hwang, and Rodrik argue runs from export sophistication to growth rather than the other way around for goods export. Thus there is clear evidence that countries that produce services of higher quality grow faster. Most of the South Asian countries were exporting services of much higher quality than their incomes suggest in 1995. While India and Sri Lanka have remained above the norm, Nepal and Pakistan had moved below the norm by 2006 4 . Bangladesh has always been below the norm. India is an exceptional story. They have moved way ahead in terms of service exports sophistication over the period. The level of sophistication of India's export is very much comparable to rich countries like UK, Ireland and USA. In essence India is producing goods which are being produced by rich countries. Since it is the sophistication of the exports which matter for growth, in this changed global trade scenario, South Asian countries are going to benefit a lot. Their service exports are of very high quality and modern. Over the period it is this high quality of exports which has grown much faster. So, at this troubled time they can exploit their high sophistication to recover from the crisis. However, the policy implication for other South Asian countries which are below the norm is that they should try to catch up with their neighbors and try modernize their service exports.
Service growth and exports are more resilient
The globalization of services will continue to be a strong force for two reasons. First, services account for more than 70 percent of global GDP, more than double in size compared to the manufacturing sector. So, there is tremendous scope for services globalization. Second, the cost differential in the production of services across the world is enormous. In the past, the only option to narrowing such cost differentials was through migration, but migration has been heavily regulated and global international migration has remained steady at about 3 percent for decades. Now that service providers can sell services without crossing national borders by making use of the internet (outsourcing), the scope for exploiting cost differentials is much higher. What is more, it is very hard for governments to regulate modern impersonal services, so prospects for rapid expansion in service exports are good.
How resilient is service growth to the decline in investment? To see this we look at the dependence of manufacturing and service sector growth on investments. This will determine whether the slow down in investment will affect South Asia differently. We run a cross section OLS for 1995 -05 on manufacturing and service growth against investment rate controlling for the factors associated with growth. We use controls for financial development (proxied for by percentage of domestic credit provided by banks), openness (proxied for ratio of exports and imports to GDP), initial level of development (proxied for by initial GDP per capita) and demographic features (proxied for by population growth). Results are presented in Table 3 . We see that growth in manufacturing and services both depend positively on investment rate. However the interesting and striking feature is that the coefficient on investment rate is much higher for manufacturing than for services. It suggests that manufacturing growth is much more dependent on investment rate than service growth. This has a significant implication for the macro stability and recovery of South Asia. In the wake of slowing down of investments, it implies that the service sector which is the mainstay of growth miracle of South Asia is likely to suffer less and also the recovery is likely to be faster.
South-South Trade
Another interesting feature of last decade has been a shift in the direction of trade. There is growing evidence that in the period of globalization developing countries are increasingly engaging in more South-South trade. The share of South-South trade is on the rise. Some kind of decoupling has started taking place between the business cycles of South and North (Prasad et al 2008) . We plot the share of bilateral trade in the total trade between India and China, and India and USA (Figure 10 ). It shows that the bilateral trade between India-China has been on Another interesting thing to note is that since the onset of the crisis, trade between India and China has held up while between India and USA has shown a declining trend. This is clear cut evidence that South-South trade is far more important now and has recovered much faster than South-North trade. There is similar evidence from other South Asian countries. Share of exports from Pakistan to UAE plus Afghanistan has surpassed the share of exports from Pakistan to USA (Figure 11 ). It is also worth noting that all the top four importing countries to Pakistan are developing countries or Middle Eastern countries. Similarly for Bangladesh and Sri Lanka, China and India are the two most important trading partners accounting for 30% of their total imports for both the countries.
Decoupling of trade for South Asia only means that for its own recovery, the region is not fully dependent on the developed economies recovery. South Asia is not yet as globally integrated as other regions. This crisis provides an opportunity to open its doors not only to the rest of the world but also to its neighbors. Increased South-South trade in the region could add two percentage points more to GDP growth and enable the land locked regions in Afghanistan, Pakistan, Nepal, Bangladesh and lagging regions of India to transform globalization into inclusive growth.
Thus we see the unique and distinctive growth and trade patterns of South Asia are going to help rather than hinder the recovery. Its high quality service exports led growth is likely to help it recover quickly and sustain its high growth in the medium run. 
C. Capital flows, recovery and growth
South Asia has become much more financially integrated in the global economy over the last decade receiving higher capital inflows than ever before. With the onset of crisis, the euphoria of massive inflows witnessed by some economies of the region has given way to reversal of capital flows. With the ongoing global financial restructuring, it will take time for private foreign capital flows to recover. Even then the capital flows will be less accessible in a new risk-averse environment, and the cost of capital will be higher. How does this changed financial architecture going to affect recovery and medium term growth of South Asia?
In order to analyze this question we examine -how dependent is South Asia on these capital flows for growth? How vulnerable are the capital flows to South Asia?
Domestic Savings driving Investments in South Asia
Before analyzing how dwindling capital inflows are going to affect the investment prospects in South Asia, we look at how South Asia was doing in terms of investment as compared to rest of the world prior to the crisis. To gauge the impact of reduced capital flows on investment, we need to examine how this huge investment is provided for. Is it through domestic savings or external capital? How does South Asia do on domestic savings front? Are they saving too little or too much?
We report the cross-country level regression on savings rate for 1995 and 2006, controlling for the level of per capita income, non-linearities in development (captured by the square of per capita income), and country size (proxied for by population) in Table 4 , panel B. It shows that amongst the South Asian economies, India and Bangladesh are positive outliers in both 1995 and 2006 6 . China as expected is a significant positive outlier too in both these years. So South Asian countries are saving much more than the rest of the world controlling for the relevant factors.
South Asian economies are investing and saving at a much higher rate than other developed and developing countries. A significant portion of the investments are coming from domestic savings. Even when capital flows have increased in significance in the last decade, high investments in South Asia have been largely driven by domestic savings. So even in the face of greatly reduced capital inflows the region will suffer less as compared to some other regions whose investments were driven by external capital. High domestic savings are going to rescue the investments (though it does not mean that investments are not going to be hit at all) and help the region to recover and sustain growth in the medium term.
South Asia entered the period of crisis with a very high savings rate. How does this high domestic savings likely to affect recovery in South Asia? We run an OLS on GDP growth and savings rate for the period 2000 -2007. We use a variety of controls which seem to have been related to growth. We use controls for financial development (proxied for by M2 as a ratio of GDP), openness (proxied for ratio of exports and imports to GDP), initial level of development (proxied for by initial GDP per capita) and demographic features (proxied for by life expectancy at birth). The results are presented in Table 5 . 5 We picked 1995 and 2006 to see how the saving and investment behavior changed before and after the East Asian financial crisis. 6 We picked 1995 and 2006 to see how the saving and investment behavior changed before and after the East Asian financial crisis. The results suggest that domestic savings are positively and significantly related to growth controlling for various factors. South Asian countries have a large and significant positive savings rate compared to other developing countries, thus they are likely to recover quickly from the crisis.
How vulnerable is South Asia to declining capital flows?
South Asia has been peculiar in attracting capital flows. Even though different kinds of flows in the region have been increasing, remittances are the most important capital flows into the region (dwarfing the other forms of flows). 1 9 9 0 1 9 9 1 1 9 9 2 1 9 9 3 1 9 9 4 1 9 9 5 1 9 9 6 1 9 9 7 1 9 9 8 1 9 9 9 2 0 0 0 2 0 0 1 2 0 0 2 2 0 0 3 2 0 0 4 2 0 0 5 2 0 0 6 2 0 0 7 e
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Private debt and portf olio equity FDI ODA Recorded Remittance Figure 12 shows that the bulk of capital inflows into the South Asian economy consist of remittances followed by FDI in 2007, both relatively stable forms of capital flows.
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While remittances amount to almost 6 percent of GDP, FDI inflows amount to one-third of this. Portfolio and other investment inflows only account for a small portion of the total inflows in the region. As a share of gross domestic product (GDP), remittances were 3.1 percent of GDP for South Asia in 2007 -compared to 2 percent of GDP for all developing countries. Remittances as a share of GDP were the highest in Nepal (15.5 percent), followed by Bangladesh (9.5 percent), Sri Lanka (8.1 percent), Pakistan (4.2 percent) and India (2.4 percent). See Figure 14 . 
shares of remittances in GDP and imports
Notes: Robust standard errors are reported in parenthesis*** represents significance at 1%, ** represents significance at 5%, * represents significance at 10%. Country size is measured by area in square kilometers I n d ia B a n g l a d e s h P a k is t a n S r i L a n k a 15.5 N e p a l B a n g l a d e s h S r i L a n k a P a k is t a n I n d ia (% of GDP, 2007) Is South Asia an outlier on remittances? Table 6 shows that South Asian countries were significant and positive outliers when we compare their remittances as a ratio of GDP with the rest of the world, and control for stage of development, country size and nonlinearities in development. India, Bangladesh, Pakistan, and Sri Lanka were all significant positive outliers compared to the norm in 1982. China was not a significant outlier compared to the norm. Thus remittances have been an important source of foreign exchange for South Asia. However, its importance as a source of foreign exchange earning has declined over time in India and Pakistan. Bangladesh, Sri Lanka and Nepal, however, remained significant and positive outliers in 2005, when we compare their share of remittances in GDP with more than 100 countries. These results hold up when we compare their remittances as a ratio of imports. Considering that remittances are the major form of capital for the region the next question is how stable are remittances compared to other forms of capital inflows? Remittances are distinctive by their stability, persistence, and reliability. In order to examine the resilience of remittances to South Asia, coefficient of variation of remittance flows is constructed relative to three other categories of external financial flows -foreign direct investment (FDI), private debt and portfolio equity; and official development assistance (ODA) for 1998 to 2007. These findings are presented in Figure 15 . Private debt and portfolio equity flows to South Asia were the most volatile, with a coefficient of variation of 134 percent, followed by FDI with the coefficient of variation of 89 percent. Migrant remittances were significantly less volatile than both categories of private flows, with variation coefficient of 40 percent during 1998 to 2007. The volatility of migrant remittances was slightly higher than that of official aid during this period. Migrant remittances received by South Asia were therefore more stable than foreign direct investment and other private capital flows and behaved similarly to official aid between 1998 and 2007. 
South Asia likely to benefit from its demographic composition
This financial crisis has seen a surge in protectionist policies both in developing and developed countries in terms tightening the barriers to migration and outsourcing.
Having considered the importance of remittances and services in the growth and recovery process of South Asia it is pertinent to look if these protectionist policies going to significantly affect the prospects of South Asian recovery and medium term growth. To answer this question we look at trend of the demand and supply of labor in the developed economies. During 2000-2050, share of population above 60 is going to increase considerably. Bloom et al.(2008) have shown that in the period 1994-2006, rate of growth of 60+ population in developed countries has been 12.6% as compared to -0.5% in the developing countries. The projections suggest that the proportion of 60+ population in developed countries is going to be much larger than in the developing countries. Region wise projections are shown in Figure 16 . As it is evident, Europe and North America are going to have much higher population of 60+ than Asia by 2050.
Since different age groups have different economic needs and productive capacities this increase in old age population is going to has a significant impact on the growth prospects of the countries. 60+ population work less, save less and generally will need more social spending. This means developed countries are going to have a significant shortfall in labor and capital in the coming decades.
Since South Asia has a very different age profile, it is imperative that this shortfall in labor in advanced countries has to be met from South Asia and Sub-Saharan Africa.
Thus in the coming decades to keep up the economic growth in advanced countries it appears that protectionist policies in terms of migration and outsourcing are not going to work. In order to grow, advanced economies have to allow for migration and outsourcing. Thus in the medium and long term, we don't see much decline in either remittances or service exports.
So South Asia, which is less dependent on foreign capital and rely more on less volatile remittances is much better placed than other regions to recover quickly despite a fall in global capital flows.
D. Macro-economic management, recovery and growth
A good strategy for emerging markets is to run counter-cyclical fiscal policies, so that they tighten fiscal policies during booms and go for fiscal stimulus during downturn. This has worked well in developed economies which have automatic stabilizers. If countries have low public debt and sound external balance they can go for a large counter-cyclical fiscal policy. However, South Asian countries have weak track record on macro management. In boom times they did not do enough to reduce the budget and trade deficits. The food and oil price increases aggravated the problem and left most countries in South Asia with widening twin deficits. This has severely restricted the scope of these countries to use counter-cyclical fiscal policies to boost aggregate demand and prevent economic downslide during the crisis.
However, this peculiar feature of South Asia, that it ran large budget deficits before the global downturn actually seems to have proved a boon in disguise for these economies. India increased the wages of civil servants, increased food, fuel and fertilizer subsidies and gave loan waivers to farmers. Consequent increase in the domestic demand has more than compensated the loss in external demand and has helped in sustaining positive growth rates during the crisis period.
Room for fiscal policy limited
Is there room for countercyclical fiscal policy? Discretionary fiscal measures can either come from the revenue side, in the form of tax breaks, or through higher expenditures, or a combination of the two. Even in the absence of discretionary measures, revenues were expected to decline, and are indeed declining, with the slowdown in economic activity. Governments are faced with a choice of either reducing expenditures to match the falling revenues, or run a possibly much higher deficit. On the expenditure side, a major positive for South Asia, the largest net importer of commodities (food, metal, and oil) in relation to GDP, is the sharp decline in commodity prices, especially oil. Given that this would bring a sharp contraction in the large commodity-related subsidies, these 'savings' could be used to finance discretionary fiscal stimulus (see Figure 17) . Note, however, that despite these savings the overall deficit to be financed could nevertheless be substantial.
The capacity of a country to undertake countercyclical fiscal policy depends upon its ability to finance the accompanying fiscal deficit without jeopardizing macroeconomic stability. Options for financing include borrowing (domestic or external), donor grants, or monetization. If there is strong evidence that through monetizing its deficit the government can address a key bottleneck, the alleviation of which will allow a quick increase in output (supply response), then such financing could be justified. However, it will always be a risky proposition especially in countries with a weak track record of fiscal discipline and where inflation fears have not abated. Once introduced such financing may be hard to reverse. Relative to a set of lower middle income and middle income countries, prior to the global downturn, South Asian countries ranked well below the median on a fiscal space index (save for Nepal) (see Figure 18 ). 8 However they did somewhat better on the external space index reflecting, for instance in India, an accumulation of reserves and low private external debt. In terms of the indices countries far in the N-E quadrant should generally have the ability to run a countercyclical fiscal policy while those deep in the S-W quadrant would not. Prior to the crisis S. Asia fell in the "undefined" zone. Though Pakistan and Sri Lanka were arguably closer to the "no space" zone they appear to be firmly there after the global downturn has intensified.
To combat the economic and social downturn, South Asian countries have announced fiscal packages to boost their economies. The fiscal stimulus has been largely targeted towards building social and physical infrastructure as well as strengthening the social safety nets. Infrastructure spending can provide an effective counter-cyclical stimulus in South Asia. The South Asia region enters the current global crisis with very low endowments of infrastructure stock and services. Counter-cyclical public spending in infrastructure is an effective tool both to provide the foundation for rapid recovery and job creation, and to develop a robust economic platform for long term growth. 8 The median refers to data for lower middle income and middle income countries and so does not strictly apply to Bangladesh and Nepal. Also in these two countries the relatively large availability of grants gives the impression of higher fiscal and external space. The fiscal space index reflects levels of public debt and fiscal deficits over the last five years, while the external space index reflects external private debt, reserves, and current account deficits. 
South Asia is a negative outlier in investment in Infrastructure
In order to examine the role of fiscal stimulus, we examine how much South Asian economies are spending on physical and social infrastructures, and what is the potential of this stimulus in overcoming the crisis. Is South Asia spending too much or too little on education, health, roads, power and water compared to the rest of the world? Source: WDI *** represents significance at 1%, ** represents significance at 5%, * represents significance at 10%. Country size is measured by population. Table 7 reports cross-country regressions on public expenditure on education and health both as a share of GDP and total government expenditure. As evident, South Asia is a big negative outlier controlling for the level of income, non-linearities in development and country size (proxied for by population). In terms of expenditure on health, all countries in South Asia are big negative outliers. Pakistan is a large negative outlier on expenditure on education. This global downturn provides an opportunity to increase spending on education and health. This will not only help in stimulating the economy but also serve to bring them at par with the rest of the world.
What about physical infrastructure? Is South Asia investing too little or too much? The biggest problem in answering this question is the extreme paucity of comparable data for a large number of countries. The data reported for different countries use very different definitions thus limiting the scope of our exercise. Source: WDI *** represents significance at 1%, ** represents significance at 5%, * represents significance at 10%. Country size is measured by population.
One way to get around this problem is to look at how infrastructure outcomes vary across the countries when we control for the stage of development, non linearity in development and country size. We looked at several outcome variables (% of population having access to improved sanitation, roads paved as % of total roads, and per capita electric power consumption) to ascertain if South Asia differs from rest of the world. The results are presented in Table 8 .
As we can see India is a big and significant negative outlier on access to sanitation after controlling for stage of development, non linearity in development and size. Sri Lanka is a large positive outlier amongst the South Asian countries. South Asian countries are no different from the norm on paved roads as a share of total road. The exception is Bangladesh. It is a significant negative outlier. All South Asian countries are no different than the norm on energy power consumption per capita. Both India and China have positive coefficients, although they are not significantly different from zero. Only Bangladesh and Sri Lanka have negative coefficients. Since the comparable data availability for public expenditure on physical infrastructure is not readily available we just do simple plots to see how countries differ on spending on transport, communication, power and water & sanitation 9 . The plots are presented as Figures (19)-(22) . From the plots it is clear that among the sample countries, for a given level of per capita income, India is under investing in all these sectors. As expected some of the East Asian countries (notably China, except in water and sanitation) are spending a higher proportion of their GDP for the level of per capita income they have.
All this rudimentary analysis points to the fact that there is a big gap in infrastructure spending in South Asia and there lies a big scope for going for a large scale infrastructure spending. Investment in infrastructure is likely to promote growth and create employment.
All in all, in South Asia, where countries lag on infrastructure development and spending (both social and physical) it can be a good strategy to increasing spending on them. It is likely to stimulate GDP and employment growth. Also, it will set the stage for future high growth and help them to bridge the gap and come at par with more advanced economies.
E. Conclusion
While many feared that exposing South Asia's economy to globalization and global competition would reveal South Asia's economic weakness, it has rather revealed strengths (often unexpected strengths in new areas no planner would have dreamed of).
The peculiarities of South Asia's globalization are reflected in trade channels, capital flow channels, and in economic management. South Asia's trade channels differ from other regions of the world as its trade to GDP ratio is small, its service exports (modern ITC export, and migration and remittances) are more resilient, and it is experiencing a rapidly increasing South-South Trade. The quality of export from South Asia is very similar to those of the rich countries. These peculiar features of the South Asia's trade model have not prevented South Asia's growth from falling, but as recovery begins, its diversified trade model will accelerate the recovery. Also the structural transformation of the region from agriculture to services holds an enormous potential for recovery and sustained growth. Overall, there are ample opportunities for South Asian countries to catch up with developed countries and grow. South Asia's capital flow models also differ from the rest of the world. It is not as dependent as Eastern Europe on capital flows. Its domestic savings rate is very high. South Asia is starting from a strong position of high investments and savings. Most of its investment needs are met by domestic savings. The region has been unique in terms of attracting more resilient capital flows. Remittances are the major capital inflow in the region. Being less volatile they are likely to hold up in the crisis and help the recovery of the region.
The third peculiar feature of South Asia is that it ran large budget deficits before the global downturn. This helped them tide over the decline in global demand and record positive growth. But as recovery deepens, South Asia will need to tighten fiscal policy and reduce the size of public debt which is relatively large. Declining commodity prices have created some room for pursuing counter-cyclical fiscal policy. Given that South Asia is a big negative outlier on infrastructure (both physical and social) it is imperative that they should target their stimulus to increase their infrastructure base. It will not only help in staging a recovery in the short run, it will go a long way in sustaining growth in the medium run.
The peculiarities mean that South Asia will dance to different tunes. It will ride on the wave of service led growth, high domestic savings supporting high investments, and less volatile capital inflows.. 
Annex A: List of variables, data description and sources

